L'architecte fondit dans une élévation comprise la hauteur des bas-côtés et celle de la tribune normande de Lanfranc pour lancer les voûtes basses à plus de quinze mètres de hauteur. De la nef, vue axialement, ou n'apercevoir que les gers des pilastres articulées. L'élevation ne s'approchait que diagonalement, en se déplaçant. Entre la sallie des pilastres et le géométral du mur se glisse une monolithe continue du pavement à la voûte, qui inscrit les supports dans un ordre colossal réduit, vibrant des demi-teintes de la lumière. Les valeurs plastiques subsistent le graphisme inaccessible des panneaux du style romanant. Qui fut le créateur de ce décalé équilibre? Woodman me que ce fut Heny Yevele, un peu d'après le prince qu'on doit pas prêter aux riches. Les documents qu'il analyse suggèrent que Thomas de Ho dirigera l'oeuvre dans la période vitale 1377-1392, et que Stephen Loe ajoutera des raffinements. Cependant, Heny Yevele est représenté par deux portraits at techniques dans la cathédrale et son tombe au deuxième place dans les comptes. De sorte qu'il est permis de se demander si Heny Yevele, qui supervise toute l'architecture de cette époque, ne devait pas former, comme l'étonnant dortoir de Lauffranc, à la mesure de son plan ambitieux, porter à court ensemble le nombre des moines de la communauté. Avec l'oeuvre d'égard romanesque, il ne manque qu'une illustration de qualité correspondante. Beaucoup de détails restent indistincts dans les reproductions. Quelques-uns l'illustration n'éclaire pas un point spectaculaire. Et il n'y a même pas d'exacte de la cathédrale avec la projection des voûtes.

PHILIPPE VERDIER
Université de Montréal


Cornell University Press published this Cornell University dissertation. The author made a few alterations in transforming the dissertation into a book. The title, Panofsky and the Foundations of Art History, is deceptive since the author focuses on three major essays written by Panofsky between 1913 and 1925 (Chapters 2, 3, 5) and surveys superficially a highly selective and very representative sample of art historical writings throughout the remaining chapters. Holly limits herself almost exclusively to philosophical sources for the art historians with whom she concentrates: Panofsky, Wolfflin, Riegl. There is no new primary research and there are few new convincing ideas in the book. Even as a summary of criticism on the art historians or their texts, the book falls far short of any scholarly ideal. This is a seriously flawed book.

What is a scholar's ideal of a historical essay? Minimal expectations are that the book must be well-written, provide new facts or previously unpublished material, and interpret this new evidence along with the old in an interesting and provocative fashion. One expects the author to master the primary evidence prior to evaluating interpretations of it by previous historians or critics. Holly's book does not fulfill any of these criteria, even partially.

The book is replete with quotations on every page, mostly from secondary sources. Holly rarely expresses her own position on a problem. One has to assume that she agrees with every quotation she cites and was unable to express the idea any better. Consider page 53. Holly argues that Wölfflin was a phenomenologist in works dating from 1900. While discussing Hulse's phenomenology in the text, she cites Bochenek, a secondary source, in the footnotes. A quotation which we assume is from Hulse, but the footnote refers to Bochenek. We have no idea if Holly has read Hulse or speaks with firsthand knowledge of his work. The more important problem is: how does she prove that Wölfflin was a phenomenologist? The only proof offered is a parenthetical assertion that Wölfflin would have known of Hulse's work through Dilthey. However, Wölfflin was Dilthey's student in 1885, prior to Hulse's phenomenological writings and Dilthey's engagement with them. By 1900, Dilthey was not a primary influence on Wölfflin. It is doubtful that Wölfflin even read Dilthey between 1885 and 1901 when he joined the faculty of Berlin University (see Joan Hart, Heinrich Wölfflin: An Intellectual Biography, diss. U. of California, Berkeley, 1981). Contrary to Holly's 'it seems safe to suggest' this phenomenological project, it would seem safer not to assert it. If Holly means that Wölfflin was concerned with the forms of art and their immediate visual apprehension, we find proof of this in his earliest writings, which predate Hulse's phenomenology and which are unrelated to Hulse's far more philosophical project.

This error highlights one of the most important problems of the book. Holly's thesis is that art historians have always been consumed with philosophical ideas. She adopts Michael Podro's thesis that Hegel is the primary foundation for art history.
and this 'Hegelian contextualist' tradition is a positive one. Podro borrowed the idea from E. H. Gombrich, who, in *In Search of Cultural History*, viewed the overwhelming influence of Hegel as an unfortunate problem for the discipline. Podro transformed Gombrich's thesis into a mostly positive one in *The Critical Historians of Art*. Podro's book is useful because he argues the point consistently in the writings of art historians, many of whom are no longer read. Podro, because he is concerned with accurate textual analysis, engages our attention. Holly, the epigone of Podro, does not even convince us that she has always read the art historians and philosophers, but only texts about them. She quotes Gombrich and Hauser on the same page in confirmation of the same point, notwithstanding the varying perspectives of the two on Hegel and many other issues.

When she discusses Dilthey (pp. 38-40), she refers to Mandelbaum, Plantinga, Hoy and Rickman as sources. Not only is it unclear that she has even looked at a text by Dilthey, but in identifying him (and Hegel) as a historian, rather than a philosopher, our doubts deepen.

The reader would like to be convinced of Hegel's pervasive influence on art historians. Holly provides little evidence of it. Anyone, it seems, who is a 'contextualist,' who cites sources outside artistic ones for the understanding of art must be a Hegelian. Since there are few art historians who are purely formalists in Holly's strict sense of the term, everyone is bound to be a Hegelian. This is a trivial thesis. I suggest anyone seriously interested in how Hegel might ground a discipline read Gillian Rose's *Hegel and Sociology*.

Because Holly is preoccupied with the philosophical foundations of art history, she often does justice neither to the art historian nor the philosophers. In the chapter 'Panofsky and Wolfflin,' Wolfflin is characterized in succession as being a positivist, a neo-Kantian, a Hegelian, a phenomenologist, a biologist. One wonders how Wolfflin managed to avoid severe criticism for maintaining so many mutually contradictory ideologies?

The chapter on 'Panofsky and Cassirer' is exemplary in demonstrating Holly's 'method.' Not only does Holly not convince us of Panofsky's great debt to Cassirer in his essay which is the focus of the chapter — 'Die Perspektive als symbolische Form' in *Verträge der Bibliothek Warburg*, 1924-25 — but she does not interpret his essay correctly either. Before discussing this essay, Holly summarizes Cassirer's philosophy for fifteen pages. She begins the chapter by quoting Edgar Wind, testifying to the eminence of Cassirer among neo-Kantians. Although she informs us that Cassirer and Panofsky were colleagues at Hamburg, she does not explain that Wind was a student of both at Hamburg and that Wind was cited by Panofsky more frequently than Cassirer. Holly's discussion of Cassirer is studied with quotations and references to mostly secondary sources, and concludes with the statement that Cassirer did not write much about the visual arts until 1944. The reader begins to wonder why an entire chapter is devoted to Cassirer's influence on Panofsky.

Katherine Gilbert comes to Holly's aid and is quoted at length concerning the importance of Cassirer for Panofsky. Finally, Holly begins to discuss Panofsky on 'Perspective as Symbolic Form,' although the summary is difficult to follow, since it is interrupted by the ever-present quotations from diverse sources (Wartovsky, Rieg!, Cassirer, other publications by Panofsky, which Holly says are unrelated to the perspective one. Heidel, Wittgenstein, Goodman and so on). Holly states that the main controversial assertion by Panofsky is that perspectival constructions have no absolute validity, no claim to representing space as we actually see it (p. 131). This is not the core, only the starting point of Panofsky's argument. Panofsky actually says something far more interesting: perspective is a mathematical abstraction from 'real' or 'psychophysiological' space; not only is perspective not veridical, but spatial representations, including perspective, are always interpretations, are always 'symbolic forms'.

That Holly has not understood Panofsky's article becomes clear when she discusses his assertions about the 'retinal image.' Panofsky's whole argument concerning perspectival or curvilinear space, based on the idea that we see a 'retinal' image, is patently false. Long before Panofsky wrote this essay, few perceptual psychologists or physiologists would have claimed that we see a retinal image, whether the retina is curved or not. The eye is not a dumb receptor, but is a processor, affected by the functioning of the optical system (accommodation, focus, stereoscopy, cognition are among many factors in seeing). Thus, when Holly accepts Panofsky's or anyone's claims about seeing a retinal image, she misses the error in their argument.

The concave shape of the retina is important for Panofsky's argument, even at this 'lowest', pre-psychological stratum of fact, because he argues from it to the idea that the size of the visual angle determines the sizes of objects seen, not the distance of objects from the eye which is the assumption of perspective. Holly does not inform us of this crucial point and describes how bewildering all of Panofsky's diagrams are (p. 135). The diagrams are crucial to his argument, whether they are based on specious assumptions or not, because without them he cannot explain or demonstrate clearly the difference between spatial constructions based on the retinal image (vanishing axis constructions) and those of perspective. Section II of Panofsky's essay is a discussion of the purported 'vanishing axis' or fishbone construction that he believes the ancients devised, based on the visual angle and curvature of the retina. After attempting to prove the existence of a vanishing axis construction, Panofsky finds that it results in an unstable and incoherent space, although it should be more like the way we really see. Panofsky is forced to conclude that artificial perspective, although not veridical, is a logical and stable spatial construction in contrast to the vanishing axis system which he thought to be veridical, but found to be not 'free from contradiction.' Curiously, Panofsky continued to discuss the latter construction in *The Codex Hergonius, Leonardo da Vinci's Art Theory and Renaissance and Renaissance*, despite his negative finding. Thus, Holly imagines Panofsky to have an 'irrational' argument (pp. 135-138), but on the contrary, Panofsky's logic is consistent, if based on inaccurate assumptions.

Having observed the inadequacy and failure of the ancients' early attempt at a veridical spatial construction, Panofsky continues in Section III to outline the history of spatial constructions up to and including artificial perspective. In tracing this evolution, Panofsky recreates the struggles of each era in attempting to depict solid bodies in immaterial space. He is primarily concerned that we understand exactly what the achievement of Brunelleschi was in inventing perspective: 'What was achieved was a translation of psychophysiological space into mathematical space; in other words,
an objectification of the subjective. He discusses in Section iv the interpretation of perspective as a symbolic form with its various practitioners. There is no vacillation in Panofsky's argument.

He establishes at the outset that perspective is not veridical, he then attempts to describe the fate of a "veridical" construction, and finally shows the logic of evolution to Renaissance perspective, in all its ambiguity.

Holly never demonstrates that she understands Panofsky's argument, having been misled by Wartovsky and her other secondary sources as to its proper interpretation. She continually interjects inappropriate arguments into her discussion—a long discussion of the division of the article into a 'synchronic', mechanistic argument versus a later 'diachronic' one where no such division exists; she refers to Riegl as the source for Panofsky on Hellenistic impressionism, when Franz Wickhoff's Die Wiener Genesis (1893) is clearly the source. Holly never mentions Kern's articles on perspective which Panofsky cites frequently.

It is a thankless task to catalogue all the errors in this book. Apart from the horrendous writing (consider 'be-speaks historicity'), the misinterpretations, and errors concerning Panofsky, Wölfflin and Riegl, the astonishing number of quotations from secondary sources and the inability of the author to speak her own mind, Holly makes the very error in interpretation which she accuses Panofsky of making in regard to works of art (Hausser is her source): an overreliance on philosophy. Panofsky provides much evidence of his sources in footnotes famous for their erudition and rareness are they from philosophers. If Holly had read carefully Franz Ringer's book, The Decline of the German Monarchy, which she cites in her Bibliography, she would know of the structure of the German education system at the turn of the century. Philology still dominated the course of study, psychology was becoming autonomous from philosophy just as art history was becoming independent from history departments. Panofsky, by his own admission, was influenced by individuals in all these fields. Instead of portraying the real world, Holly confounds her subject and us with a startling array of anachronistic and anachronomistic parallels, as she hops from conceptual island to conceptual island in an archipelago of thought, surrounded by a sea of confusion.

Joan Hart
Archives of American Art, Washington.